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THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: IN SEARCH
OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
ELYCE ZENOFF FERSTER,* THOMAS F. COURTLESS,*"
AND EDITH NASH SNETHEN *
I. INTRODUCTION
S EVERAL important questions about a child's right to counsel in de-
linquency proceedings were left unanswered by the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in the case of In re Gault.' The Court held that
if the delinquency proceedings may result in commitment to an institu-
tion, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by retained counsel. They must also be told that counsel will
be appointed for him if they are unable to afford counsel." However,
many important issues, including those listed below, were not touched on
in the Gault opinion:
1. Who must notify the parents and child of this right? When should
they be notified?
2. Can the right to counsel be waived? If so, by whom and under what
conditions?
3. Is the function of counsel at the adjudicatory stage the same as or
different from that of counsel in criminal cases?
4. What is the function of counsel at the dispositional stage?
5. Does the right to counsel extend to revocation of probation?
3
Almost four years have passed since the Gault decision. During this
time, the bar, the bench and the legislatures have been trying to answer
these questions. This article, the fourth in a series reporting the findings
of a three year study4 on "The Juvenile Offender and the Law," describes
some of the answers which have been found and suggests some solutions
in those areas which remain troublesome.' It is based on an analysis of
* Professor of Law and Director, The Juvenile Offender and the Law Project, The
George Washington University, The National Law Center.
** Associate Professor of Law & Sociology, Co-Director, The Juvenile Offender and the
Law Project, The George Washington University, The National Law Center.
*** Research Attorney, The Juvenile Offender and the Law Project.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id. at 41.
3. See Ketcham, Guidelines From Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal,
53 Va. L. Rev. 1700, 1703, 1716-17 (1967).
4. The study is supported by Public Health Service Grant MH-14500 from the National
Institute of Mental Health.
5. See also Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and
the Juvenile Offender, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 567 (1969); Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, Sepa-
rating Official and Unofficial Delinquents: Juvenile Court Intake, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 864
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statutes and cases, a review of the literature (including statistical and
field reports), and a field study of "Affluent" County conducted by the
study staff.'
II. COUNSEL AT THE ADJUDICATORY STAGE
A. Notice
In the Gault case the Supreme Court merely stated that Mrs. Gault
and her son "had a right expressly to be advised that they might retain
counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific consideration of
whether they did or did not choose to waive the right."7
Other than requiring express advice, the Supreme Court did not dic-
tate elements of "adequate" notice. Should written notice be sent to the
child or his parents before the hearing? If written notice is required,
must the judge also determine that the minor and parents know of the
right and understand its significance?
Under model procedures recommended by organizations such as the
Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the Children's Bureau, the sum-
mons or notice sent to the child and his parents before the bearing is
intended to communicate the child's right to counsel. In addition, they
require that notice of the right to counsel be given at the hearing. Some
of the states which have amended their codes since Gault have similar
provisions.'
Correspondence with courts10 and reports of two field studies on the
implementation of the Gault decision indicate that written notice is used
extensively. In one study (hereinafter called The Lefstein Study),"
(1970) ; Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection, Prevention or Punish.
ment?, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 161 (1969).
6. Affluent County has an estimated 1969 population of 500,000 and has the highest
median family income of any county in the U.S. For example, 34,400 families earn between
$10,000 and $15,000; 47,600 families fall in the $15,000 to $25,000 income range; and an
additional 18,000 earn over $25,000. These three family groups represent 78% of the total
families residing in the county. Department of Community Development, Affluent County,
Population and Social Characteristics 2.
7. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
8. Uniform Juvenile Court Act §§ 22(d), 26 [hereinafter cited as Uniform Act]; Na-
tional Council on Crime and Delinquency [hereinafter cited as NCCD], Model Rules for
Juvenile Courts, R. 21 & 39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Model Rules]; W. Sheridan, Legis-
lative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts § 15(b) (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Legislative Guide]. Note that § 25 of the Legislative Guide requires appointment of
counsel if counsel is not retained by the family.
9. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. ch. 260, R. 4-2 & 5-1 (1971); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-1095.14
(Supp. 1970); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 26-8-13.1, -8.22.1 (Supp. 1970).
10. See Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 Ind. L.J. 527, 531-32 (1968).
11. Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and its Im-
plementation, 3 Law & Soc'y Rev. 491 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lefstein Study]. This
376 [Vol. 39
JUVENILE JUSTICE
two of the three courts observed used written notices.' In one of these
jurisdictions, Metro, the notice suggested contacting Legal Aid if the
family wanted a lawyer and could not afford one, but did not mention
the court's duty to appoint one in these circumstances.' In another,
Gotham, the notice referred to the "right to retain and be represented by
counsel," with no reference at all to the possibility of the family's in-
ability to engage counsel.14
Written notice of the right to counsel is also used in Affluent County,
the jurisdiction studied by the authors. The pertinent portions of the
statement are set out below:
If you desire to have your child represented by an attorney-and you cannot afford
to employ one, you should notify the court and submit a sworn statement as to your
income and expenses. If the court determines that you cannot afford to employ an
attorney, it will appoint one to represent your child.
This statement is similar to Metro's in that it does not mention that
the court has a duty to make the appointment. Moreover, it implies that
the juvenile's right to counsel depends upon the parent's willingness to
submit a written statement of his income and expenses.
Even if the notices used in these jurisdictions are sufficient on their
face, it is doubtful that they fulfil the court's responsibility to notify the
juvenile of his right to counsel. It has been suggested that in order to
fulfill this responsibility
a court has the inherent duty of satisfying itself by ascertaining from any person,
adult or infant, whether or not he has funds with which to hire counsel... and ...
where indigency is found to exist, and after full advice, if the accused does not waive
an offer of court-appointed counsel, the court has the further duty of appointing
counsel to represent him before proceeding with trial.15
Also, it seems clear that juvenile courts should determine that the
minor and his parents know of the right to counsel and understand its
significance."8
This view that written notice alone is not sufficient seems to be shared
to some extent by the jurisdictions studied, because at least in some cases
they supplement written notice with oral notice at the first hearing. 17
study observed the implementation of Gault in three metropolitan juvenile courts in three
different states.
12. Id. at 506.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (ND. filss. 1968). See also In re Haas, S
N.C. App. 461, 464, 168 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1969), where the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina held that facts must be elicited to show financial ability to retain counsel before
a waiver of counsel can be accepted.
16. Lefstein Study, supra note 11, at 507 & nn.32-35.
17. Approximately two-thirds of the juveniles in Metro and three-fourths of those in
1971]
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The Affluent County judges were interviewed and asked why notice
of counsel was given to some juveniles at the hearing but not to
others. judge A answered that he is not sure whether written notice is
sufficient to meet the requirements of Gault in all cases."8 Therefore, he
tells older children of their right to counsel. He does not give this in-
formation to younger children because he believes they would not un-
derstand it.' 9 One might argue that in a case where the judge believes
the juvenile would not understand notice of counsel, appointment of
counsel might be a more appropriate solution than omission of the counsel
warning. Judge B also does not consider written notice sufficient to
comply with Gault. Therefore, he said, the family is always asked if they
wish an attorney, and if the alleged delinquent is an older juvenile he is
also asked if he wishes counsel.20 However, the field reports showed that
counsel warnings were sometimes omitted by both judges.21
If the written notice is inadequate under Gault, a judge does not
remedy the deficiency by telling the child and his parents that they have
the right to retain counsel. He must also say that if they cannot afford
counsel, one will be appointed for them.
Unfortunately, many juveniles receive notice which is either incomplete
or prejudicial. For example, in one southern jurisdiction juveniles who
were involved in civil rights protests were not told that an attorney would
be appointed for them if they were unable to afford one.
22
If the right to counsel is not to be prejudiced, the judge's counsel ad-
vice should be neutral as well as complete. This right will not be exercised
freely if a judge makes it obvious that he regards the presence of counsel
as unwise or unnecessary. The Affluent County study found several ex-
amples of such prejudicial advice. In fact, one of the judges in an inter-
view recited the following statement as an example of a proper warning
Affluent County received some advice at the hearing. The rate of compliance with Gault
was much lower, however, since in both communities the advice was incomplete or preju-
didal in a large number of cases. See Table A at page 379 infra.
18. Interview with Judge A, Judge of the Affluent County Juvenile Court, in Affluent
County, Aug. 5, 1970.
19. Nor does Judge A notify a juvenile of his right to counsel if the child admits the
offense. Id.
20. Interview with Judge B, Judge of the Affluent County Juvenile Court, in Affluent
County, Aug. 21, 1970.
21. The project's court observer, a lawyer, observed Affluent County delinquency pro-
ceedings three days a week for seven weeks. The total number and allocation of observed
cases between Judges A and B were dictated by the court's own scheduling requirements.
During our observation, Judge A heard significantly more cases than Judge B.
The observer took into the courtroom a checklist form listing all pertinent areas of
inquiry. Insofar as possible, significant statements of judges and participants were taken
down verbatim. Both judges were informed that the observer was in court to take notes on
courtroom interaction, as part of an overall study of the Affluent County juvenile Court.
22. See Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049, 1050 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
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under Gault: "I notice you are not here with an attorney and I assume
that you do not wish an attorney. You may have one but it is not
required."23
Some of the other prejudicial warnings which have been used in various
communities are set out below:
[1] "Do you want a lawyer or do you want to speak for yourself?"2 4
[2] 1 certainly hope you don't want an attorney.25
[3] [Judge (very rapidly):] "At this time, I'd like to inform you that you have a
right to have an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, I'll appoint an attorney
for you. Or, on the other hand, if you'd like, we can have the case heard today."
The woman said something and the judge said, "I can't hear you."
Then the woman said that she would like to have it heard today.
[Judge:] '"et the record show that Mrs. G ...... , the mother of A .......
waives the right to an attorney."26
[4] [Judge:] Do you know he has a right to have a lawyer? Do you know that it
is your decision?
[Mother:] I didn't know. I don't know what to do.
[Judge:] Most people charged with a minor charge don't have a lawyer. We
could go ahead. Then if you feel you need one you could ask for one.2-
[The mother agreed to go ahead without counsel.]
The problems of incomplete and prejudicial notice of the right to
counsel were extensive in the jurisdictions observed, and time alone will
not solve them. Table A, which compares data from the Lefstein Study
(carried out shortly after Gault) with the Affluent County study of 1969,
shows that very few of the children involved received complete and un-
prejudiced advice of their right to counsel.
TABLE A
Comparison of Studies
Affluent Metro Zenith Gotham
No. % No. 9 No. % No. 7
Complete 11 30.6 1 1.6 8 44.0 0 0
Partial 11 30.6 15 21.1 6 33.0 7 12.0
Prejudicial 6 16.6 32 45.0 3 17.0 2 3.0
None 8 22.2 23 32.3 1 6.0 50 85.0
No. of Juveniles 36 100.0 71 100.0 18 I00.0 59 100.0
Judges who make prejudicial statements are not necessarily hostile to
the right to counsel. In fact, these same judges have appointed counsel in
23. Interview with Judge B, note 20 supra.
24. Hawes, Gault and the District of Columbia, 17 Am. U.L. Rev. 153, 158 (1968).
25. Affluent County courtroom observation, note 21 supra.
26. Lefstein Study, supra note 11, at 512.
27. Affluent County courtroom observation, note 21 supra.
1971]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
other cases where the child and the parents seemed uninformed or in-
different to the right to counsel. The reason for the statements in some
instances is simply an assumption that the written notice satisfied Gault
and that the parents and child have read the notice, understand it, and
are deliberately waiving their rights by appearing without counsel. In
other instances, it is arguable that the judge is merely informing them of
all their rights, including the right to proceed expeditiously." Still other
warnings are undoubtedly based on the judge's knowledge that he will
dismiss the case, hold it open without a finding, or at most put the child
on probation." Observations, however, show that parents do not always
understand the notice, and consequently have not thoroughly considered
the matter." Also, some children who have received inadequate or pre-
judicial counsel advice are committed to institutions."'
All these problems would disappear if the judge would tell the juvenile
and his family, "If you want a lawyer, you are entitled to have one and
I will assign counsel if you cannot afford to retain one," instead of as-
suming that the warning is not needed or that the family has decided
to waive.
B. Waiver
Determining what constitutes a valid waiver and who may exercise
it seems to be more difficult than determining what constitutes incomplete
or prejudicial counsel advice. Gault says merely that the right is not
waived when there is no knowledge of the right to appointed counsel.
28. Lefstein Study, supra note 11, at 512.
29. Id. at 530. The Lefstein Study hypothesized what our Affluent County data con-
firmed. For example, in four Affluent County cases in which counsel notices were preju-
dicial, the disposition fell far short of institutionalization. One case was continued without
finding, in two others the juveniles were placed on probation, and one case was held open
without further action.
30. For example, in one observed case in Affluent County, the child's mother asked the
judge if she could retain one of the lawyers representing a co-defendant. When told she
would have to make private arrangements, she withdrew her request. The mother later told
the judge that she did not realize that certain charges would be taken up that day. The
judge asked if she had received a notice. She said she had and the matter was dropped.
Clearly, the mother did not fully understand either the substance of the charges or the
counsel advice contained in the mailed notice.
31. Three juveniles who did not receive notice of the right to counsel at the hearing were
committed to institutions. Two were sent to state training schools and one to a semi-public
institution, The George Junior Republic. One petition alleged violation of probation based
on auto theft. In Affluent County, probation revocations based on law violations are handled
in the same way (presentation of testimony, examination of witnesses, etc.) as adjudication
hearings. See also Lefstein Study, supra note 11, at 532, which shows that 13 of the 35
juveniles committed to institutions received no counsel advice and 20 received incomplete
or prejudicial advice.
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Is waiver valid if it is based on the juvenile's desire to save his parents
counsel fees? This question was the issue in a recent California case, In
re H.32 The juvenile, a seventeen year old boy charged with participating
in a burglary, received proper counsel warnings and notice before the
proceedings. However, he was also advised that since his father was
employed, the county would be entitled to reimbursement for the cost of
appointed counsel. The juvenile told a probation officer that he would
waive his right to counsel rather than have his father obligated to pay
for it, because his father was already indebted to the county for his
prior detentions. Consequently, at the hearing he waived the right to
counsel, was adjudicated delinquent, and was committed to the California
Youth Authority.
The California Supreme Court said that a juvenile's waiver of counsel
made to avoid or reduce parental pressure or displeasure is neither in-
telligent nor voluntary, and criticized the lower court for accepting the
waiver without any attempt to determine his capacity to waive this right.?
Whether parents can waive the juvenile's right to counsel in order to
save themselves payment of attorney's fees is not an issue in California,
because the relevant statute requires the appointment of counsel when-
ever the juvenile does not execute a waiver. It also requires parents to
pay for counsel if they can afford to do so." However, the question of
whether parents can waive the juvenile's right under these circumstances
has been considered in at least two other states which do not have such
statutes. 35
Both cases involved situations in which the court did not appoint coun-
sel, presumably because it determined that the parents could afford to
retain counsel. In Blaylock v. DeFoor,30 the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the juvenile court's failure to provide counsel for the juvenile
was not a denial of due process when his father was financially able to
employ an attorney." In a similar situation, a Florida case which con-
32. 2 Cal. 3d 513, 468 P.2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970); see Comment, Does Parental
Liability for Legal Fees Infringe upon a Juveniles Constitutional Rights?, 10 Santa Clara
Law. 347 (1970).
33. 2 Cal. 3d at 525, 468 P.2d at 211, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
34. Cal. Well. & Inst'ns Code § 700 (West Supp. 1971).
35. Blaylock v. DeFoor, 225 Ga. 688, 171 S.E2d 146 (1969); In re L.G.T., 216 So. 2d
54 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1968).
36. 225 Ga. 688, 171 S.E2d 146 (1969).
37. Id. at 689, 171 S.E.2d at 148. Although the court also held that the juvenle's mother
received notice of his right to counsel and did not request counsel, the fact situation in the
case is very confusing. The information about the juvenile court proceedings is -tketchy.
The only facts which emerge dearly are that the mother was present at the hearing and
that the father was not. Nothing in the opinion indicates that the juvenile court judge had
any information about the father's income. The facts which the supreme court opinion relies
1971]
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sidered the parents' failure to provide counsel held that parental failure
to fulfill their duties to provide counsel should not deprive the child of his
constitutional rightsf 8 This position seems to be consistent with the spirit
of the Gault decision. The United States Supreme Court was requiring
notice to parents and waiver of counsel by them, as well as the child, on
the premise that the juvenile thereby received increased protection.
Clearly, the child is not receiving additional protection if the parents'
waiver is based on the desire to avoid payment of counsel fees.
The refusal of a parent to retain counsel when he is able to do so is
one example of a conflict between the parent and child which can frustrate
the implementation of the right to counsel. A case in which the charge is
initiated by the parent is another example. Petitions alleging that the
child is beyond parental control or a runaway fall into this latter cate-
gory.39
The Model Rules4" and the California Code41 both allow the court to
appoint separate counsel if the court thinks the interests of the child
and his parents conflict; it is not clear whether the automatic appoint-
ment of counsel is required in every parental control or runaway case.
The efficacy of appointing counsel in all of these cases will be discussed
in section C on The Role of Counsel, infra.
on were developed at a habeas corpus hearing based on a petition brought by the father,
which was denied and appealed to the supreme court. It was at this hearing that the
father testified that his take-home pay was $92.00 a week.
The only fact supporting the juvenile court's failure to appoint counsel was Mrs. Blay-
lock's alleged failure to request such appointment. However, her testimony at the habeas
corpus hearing was summarized as follows: "When asked whether she had an attorney, she
replied that she could not afford one.... She testified... that she owed Mr. Cobb for rep-
resenting her son in a prior juvenile court hearing [and] that Mr. Cobb would not represent
her son in this hearing unless his fee in the prior case was paid .... She did ask the court to
provide her with an attorney." Id. at 689, 171 S.E.2d at 147.
38. In re L.G.T., 216 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). The juvenile court found
that the parents of a 14 year old boy had a combined income of $140.00 per week plus
family lodging, which was suffident to provide legal services for their child's appeal of his
adjudication of delinquency. The district court of appeals reversed, saying the parents' duty
to furnish necessaries to minor children does not extend to furnishing legal services on
appeal. "Even if such a duty did exist, however, a parent's failure to fulfill such duty should
not work to deprive the minor of his constitutional rights . . . ." Id. at 56.
The position of the Advisory Council of Judges is significantly qualified. Only where the
interests of parents and children conflict does the Council urge that the child's right to an
attorney not be compromised by his parent's refusal or neglect to retain one. NCCD
Council of Judges, Provision of Counsel in Juvenile Courts 26 (1970).
39. The Lefstein Study differentiated these cases from those where the parent was not
the complaining witness, yet manifested hostility toward the child or expressed disapproval
of his conduct. Lefstein Study, supra note 11, at 547-48.
40. Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 39 (1969).
41. Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 634 (West Supp. 1971).
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Some authorities believe that counsel should be appointed as a matter
of course without requiring any affirmative choice by the juvenile or his
parents. This was the recommendation of the President's Crime Com-
mission42 and has been adopted as a practice in one of the family courts
in New York City. It is the practice in this court to say to each child:
"'Is it acceptable that Mr. So and So act as your lawyer?' ),43
Under the Crime Commission recommendation, the child or his family
could say that they do not wish an attorney. The Children's Bureau model
legislation goes further by requiring a non-waivable right to counsel. "
Only one state, Kansas, has adopted this rule 4 1 but some commentators
predict that it will become nation-wide either as a result of legislative
changes or court decisions.46
Recommendations of this type appear to be based on a series of inter-
related premises which are set out below:
1. Juvenile proceedings are "criminal prosecutions."
2. Counsel should act as an advocate and force the state to prove its
case.
3. Few adults or children can effectively invoke the right to present
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, etc., without the assistance of counsel.
4. Most delinquents and their families are too economically and so-
cially deprived to be aware of the advantages of having counsel.
If the first premise is accepted, the second and third flow quite logically
from it. The fourth premise is merely an extension which says if counsel
is so important for adult criminal defendants, children should be pro-
tected from losing it through ignorance.
However, the basic question of whether juvenile proceedings should
be criminal prosecutions is not settled. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent
in Winship,47 alleged that the Court's majority erroneously assumed
that the proceedings were criminal and that their attitude "is really a
protest against inadequate juvenile court staffs and facilities; we 'burn
down the stable to get rid of the mice.' ),48
The conflict is a result of disagreement concerning the rehabilitative
42. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Report:
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 87 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Commission Re-
port].
43. Dyson & Dyson, Family Courts in the United States, 9 J. Family L. 1, So (1969).
44. Legislative Guide, supra note 8, § 25.
45. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-817 (Supp. 1970).
46. Lefstein Study, supra note 11, at 562. Ohio's recent statutory provision still allows
a competent and intelligent waiver to defeat appointment of counsel. Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2151.352 (Supp. 1970). The provision is ambiguous about whether the parent's, child's, or
both parent's and child's waiver is required.
47. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
48. Id. at 376.
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potential of the juvenile justice system. Although the disagreement is
well-known and is easily stated, there is no simple resolution. "One
argument is that the system has failed to fulfill its rehabilitative and
preventive promise because of a grossly over-optimistic view of juvenile
criminality and because of what even a fully equipped juvenile court can
do about it."49 The other side of the argument is that the juvenile justice
concept has never been tried because some jurisdictions lack a non-
punitive system of justice in law, and in most others, which theoretically
have a non-punitive approach, it has not been accepted in fact."0 The
latter view is well expressed in a recent article by a well-known juvenile
court judge:
The adversaries of the juvenile court are still trying to return children to the
criminal law process, under the guise of protecting their constitutional rights and by
endlessly repeating the charge that the juvenile court has not fulfilled its promise.
.. . The court has not failed; rather, the communities of our country have failed
to provide the facilities and tools to complete the work of the court. One does not
discard a new car because it doesn't have gas in the tank, and we ought not discard
the juvenile court concept because county commissions, city councils, state legis-
latures, and the federal Congress do not provide the facilities to give each child
known to our courts the care and treatment he needs.5 1
At issue is the question: "Should the juvenile justice system be aban-
doned or implemented?" There is no doubt that if juvenile proceedings
are criminal, children are entitled to all the protections given to criminal
defendants and perhaps to additional ones as well. Nevertheless, it is also
important to remember that:
While the progress made in protecting the constitutional rights of the child in the
adjudicatory process is to be welcomed, it will in no way compensate for the lack
of dispositional remedies. Gault may protect some children from unfair hearings and
wrongful findings, but it will not provide one dollar's worth of professional mental
health services or one hour of care for any troubled child.5
What counsel accomplishes in court or as a result of court intervention
is as important as the child's right to counsel. Whether the actions of
counsel ameliorate the child's life is the question which will determine
the future of the juvenile justice system.
C. The Role of Counsel
The role of counsel at the fact-finding stage is still being debated.
Some commentators believe that counsel's obligations toward his juvenile
49. Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile justice, Police Practices, and the
Juvenile Offender, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 567, 568 (1969).
50. Id. at 568.
51. Noyes, Has Gault Changed the Juvenile Court Concept?, 16 Crime & Delinq. 158,
162 (1970).
52. J. Polier, The Rule of Law and the Role of Psychiatry 100 (1968).
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clients do not differ from his responsibilities to adult criminal defendants
and that, consequently, he "ought to play the part of pure advocate"
at all stages of the proceedings.5 3 Others believe that this adversary role
should be followed only during the fact-finding phase, and that the at-
torney should act as a member of the court team at disposition." Still
others believe that the concept of guardianship requires consideration
of the child's general welfare as well as his legal rights, and hence should
modify the advocate's role. Under this view "[t]he role of the 'wise
parent' has, in effect, been transferred from the court itself to the law
guardian."' 55
To date, juvenile court attorneys have received no clear guidance from
the courts or legislatures to help them decide which role to choose.57
Only one judicial opinion has been found which even mentions the issue,
and it was decided before Gault. In this case, In re Bacon,"8 the juveniles
claimed that they were deprived of effective counsel because their attorney
allowed the substantive elements of the offense to be elicited from their
testimony rather than from independent evidence. The California Court
of Appeals rejected this argument, saying that a juvenile proceeding is
not criminal. It also pointed out that counsel's activities were proper
under the applicable statute, which provides that "[e] xcept where there
is a contested issue of fact or law, the proceedings shall be conducted in
an informal nonadversary atmosphere with a view to obtaining the maxi-
mum co-operation of the minor .... ,359
Nor has the Supreme Court settled the issue. The Court did not char-
53. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 43, at 58; Paulsen, supra note 10, at S38-39.
54. See, e.g., Dyson & Dyson, supra note 43, at 60, quoting Makover, Mental Health
Services in New York City Family Court 122-23 (1966) (footnote to Appendix A); Tread-
well, The Lawyer in Juvenile Court Dispositional Proceedings: Advocate, Social Worker or
Otherwise, in Children in the Courts-The Question of Representation 411, 421-23 (Newman
ed. 1900).
55. See Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family
Court, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 501, 507 (1963).
56. See, eg., Handiler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Func-
tion and Form, 1965 WIs. L. Rev. 7, 36-39, 43-44, which describes the conflicting definitions
of the role of law guardian in the legislative history of the New York Family Court Act.
57. See, e.g., Comment, Wisconsin Juvenile Rights after Gault, 1968 Ws. L. Rev. 1219,
1231, which states that the attorney is often faced by uncertainty and inexperience as to
what role to play.
58. 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Dist. CL App. 1966).
A 1965 Vermont case held that its statutory scheme required the appointment of a
guardian ad litem as well as counsel for a juvenile accused of a felony, since the role of
the guardian to weigh alternatives is incompatible with the advocate role of the attorney.
In re Dobson, 212 A.2d 620 (Vt. 1965). However, the provision on which the court relied
has since been repealed. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 678 (Supp. 1970).
59. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 45, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 328, quoting Cal. Well. & Inst'ns Code
§ 680 (West 1966).
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acterize juvenile proceedings as criminal in either Gault60 or Winship."'
Therefore, decisions about the proper role of counsel must be made by
each individual attorney or agency.
The law guardians in New York City have adopted the role of ad-
vocate. From the beginning of the program it has been office policy to
insist strictly on all rights and privileges of the client at each stage of the
case.62 However, a study of a public defender office in another community
shows that the advocate's role has been modified by adding the role of
"guardian" or "social worker" in some cases. 3
Unfortunately, so little data is available on the activities of counsel
in the juvenile court that it is impossible to determine the extent to which
attorneys are adopting any particular role.4 In fact, even information
concerning the number of alleged delinquents who are represented by
counsel is lacking. 5
60. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Law-
yers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811, 812 (1967).
61. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
62. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 43, at 58.
63. "The public defender in Metro's juvenile court maintains two seemingly conflicting
roles. As an 'officer of the court,' . . . the public defender sees himself as a social worker.
At the same time, however, he is a defense attorney who takes pride in the craft of advo-
cacy." He distinguishes his role from appearances "'in criminal court [where] I would
just do everything I could to get my client off. But here I won't.'" Platt, Schechter &
Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 Ind.
L.J. 619, 624 (1968).
64. Only two recent studies have explored this question. See Platt, Schechter & Tiffany,
supra note 63, and Steinfeldt, Kerper & Friel, The Impact of the Gault Decision in Texas,
20 Juv. Ct. Judges J. 154 (1969).
65. Our Affluent County data shows that attorneys were present in 24% of the cases
observed.
A recent study of selected communities in the twelve states which allow jury trials In
juvenile cases showed the following results:
In nine counties, 100% of the cases had lawyers representing juveniles. These were
Topeka and Wichita, Kansas; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Amarillo, Austin, Corpus Christi, Fort
Worth, Houston, and San Antonio, Texas.
In the other fifteen counties, the following percentage of cases had lawyers representing
juveniles: (1) In more than 50% of the cases, juveniles were represented by lawyers In
El Paso, Texas; Denver, Colorado; and the District of Columbia. (2) Lawyers represented
juveniles in 50% of the cases in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and Pierre, South Dakota. (3)
They were represented by counsel in less than 25% of the cases in Dallas, Texas; Colorado
Springs, Colorado; Flint, Michigan; Lansing, Michigan; Pueblo, Colorado; and Sioux Falls,
South Dakota. (4) Counsel represented juveniles in less than 10% of the cases in Billings
and Butte, Montana; and in Grand Rapids, Michigan. In Detroit, the court appoints coun-
sel in 70 to 80 cases per month, in addition to which there are some privately retained
attorneys. Brief for Public Defenders Service for the District of Columbia and the Neigh-
borhood Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C. as Amicus Curiae at 129, In re Burrus,
cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970).
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The differences in viewpoint about the role of counsel can be explored
best by considering a specific fact situation. There is little question that
when a child strongly protests the alleged act, an attorney should zeal-
ously defend the charge in juvenile court. This view was not disputed
even before Gault. 6
Suppose, however, that the child admits the offense to the attorney.
This is the situation in about one-half of the case load of the Mletro
public defender's office mentioned earlier 7 and in "most" cases which
come to the Affluent County public defender."'
Presumably, the attorney who believes his obligations to his adult and
juvenile client are the same will advise his client to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination. 9 In contrast, the attorney who modifies his
adversary role in the juvenile court will probably not routinely advise all
his juvenile clients to claim the privilege.
A study of one public defender's office showed that the action taken
depends on whether (1) the juvenile claims to be innocent; (2) the
alleged offense is of a "serious" nature; (3) the juvenile has a prior
juvenile court record; and (4) the defender believes that the juvenile
is a "good kid" or a "bad kid.)70
If the public defender considers his client a "good kid" with little or no criminal
record, he will plead him guilty on the grounds that he will receive only a lecture,
or supervision, or probation. The public defender believes that a minimal sanction is
often what a client needs; the idea is that "these Idds need a good scare. .. "
[.. Where his client is a "good kid" but has a more substantial record, the public
defender ... will plead the youth not guilty, force the state to prove its case, and
attempt to secure a dismissal or a lenient sentence. He follows the same procedure
when the youth involved is a "good kid" who is charged with a "serious" offense. In
both instances he knows that a finding of guilty may well mean automatic commit-
ment to a reformatory. The public defender does not subscribe to the notion that
the reformatories are rehabilitative institutions capable of remedying his clients'
problems....
66. Lefstein, supra note 60, at 812.
67. Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, supra note 63, at 625-26.
68. Interview with Public Defender for Affluent County, in Affluent County, July 14,
1969.
69. See note 53 and accompanying text supra. A noted New York lawyer advises that
"decisions as to whether or not to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination must be
made in a broader and different perspective than that normally employed in adult criminal
matters.... [However,] a child's legal rights should be waived on the ground of social
desirability only with great care .... [SIhould not counsel consider such factors as the
lifetime stigma which may be the irrevocable by-product of a finding of delinquency; . . .
that rehabilitative services might be provided through other community resources[ ;]...
that ultimate disposition of the case may involve commitment to so-called 'treatment' insti-
tutions which, in fact, have 'therapeutic' facilities of no, or at least questionable, value."
Isaacs, The Lawyer in the Juvenile Court, 10 Crim. L.Q. 222, 234 (1968).
70. Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, supra note 63, at 625.
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"Bad kids" invite an attitude of despair. The public defender assumes, along with
all juvenile court functionaries, that little can be done to "help" these clients. He
pleads them guilty and cooperates in processing them into reformatories. They have
long records, they admit the offense, no "responsible" adults are willing to be their
spokesmen, and they are likely to antagonize judges with their poor school record.
The public defender does not waste his time on "bad kids." A serious effort on behalf
of these clients would only jeopardize his chances with more "worthy" defendants. 71
Some attorneys would report any admission by juveniles to the court,
even if their action involves breaching a confidential communication. 2
At least this is the implication in the report of a survey of Texas attorneys
associated with juvenile courts in the state. 78 The report says that seventy-
six percent of the respondents believe "it is their duty to present to the
juvenile court judge all facts that come to their attention including those
that may lead to an adjudication of delinquency."74 It should be noted,
however, that two-thirds of the respondents were associated with prose-
cutors' offices.7"
Even if this view accurately reflects the opinion of Texas attorneys on
the role of counsel, it certainly does not conform to that of the United
States Supreme Court. The Gault opinion refers only to the juvenile's
right to and need for the advice of counsel. Nowhere does it contain any
explicit or implicit indication that such counsel has the duty to act as a
witness for the juvenile court.
Use of the privilege against self-incrimination is only one of the issues
about which "advocates" and "modified advocates" might take different
positions. Should the attorney move to suppress illegally obtained evi-
dence if suppression would release a guilty youth?7" Should he challenge
the use of a confession taken in violation of law if the statement is, in
fact, true? 77 These questions raise substantially the same problems that
71. Id. at 626 (footnotes omitted).
72. Lefstein cites the NCCD's 1962 statement (in NCCD Council of Judges, Procedure
and Evidence in the Juvenile Court 43 (1962)) as advancing this view. Lefstein, supra note
60, at 813 n.9.
A fairer reading of the 1962 NCCD position does not support disclosing acts establishing
the allegations of the complaint, since only "facts pointing to the need for treatment" are
singled out for disclosure. NCCD, supra at 43.
73. Steinfeldt, Kerper & Friel, supra note 64, at 154.
74. Id. at 157.
75. Id. The practice of the Texas attorneys does not seem to have been at Issue In In re
Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966). The plaintiffs apparently alleged
that their attorney had a duty to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. They
did not allege that he ignored their requests to plead "not involved" or to invoke the privi-
lege.
76. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 537.
77. Id. See also Haviland, Daddy Will Take Care of You: The Dichotomy of the
Juvenile Court, 17 Kan. L. Rev. 317, 318 (1969).
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confront counsel when considering the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
Attorneys who modify their adversary role when the juvenile is guilty
still believe in the parens patriae function of the juvenile court. The
purpose of the court, in their opinion, differs from that of the criminal
courts, which exist to convict and dispose of guilty adults.78 The juvenile
courts are supposed to determine the best way to correct the child's un-
lawful behaviour-a goal which cannot be achieved if the child is en-
couraged to escape the consequences of his wrongful act. 71
Full utilization of all available rights for guilty juveniles means that
some will escape adjudication as delinquents, thus losing the opportunity
to receive treatment80 Moreover, this escape may encourage further mis-
conduct.8
There is also concern that the increased use of such defenses will be
followed by the introduction of prosecutors and an increased emphasis
on guilt and punishment.8 2 The real fear, however, involves the apocryphal
story of a judge who, hearing of Gault, said that "the Supreme Court has
ended the juvenile court." It is feared that this will soon be a fact instead
of a story.
78. Reasons, Gault: Procedural Change and Substantive Effect, 16 Crime & Delinq. 163
(1970). See also Handler, supra note 56, at 30.
79. Snyder & Mangano, Effect of Law Guardian Representation on the Treatment of
Delinquent Children, 13 Social Work, July, 1968, at 103.
80. Id.
81. Haviland, supra note 77, at 318.
82. See, e.g., Lefstein, supra note 60, at 812. The need for counsel to bring out evidence
in support of the petition has been noted by the NCCD, which suggests that the judge
decide whether he needs the aid of counsel and, if so, notify and request the "appropriate
legal officer"--the attorney general, the city or corporation counsel, or the county attorney-
to appear at the hearing. NCCD Council of judges, Provision of Counsel in juvenile Courts
18 (1970).
The necessity of providing legal counsel for the petitioner was cited by one New York
family court judge in a 1965 case. In re Lang, 44 Misc. 2d 900, 906, 2S5 N.Y.S.2d 987, 993
(Family Ct. 1965). "[The] basic lack of staff to present cases properly in what has become
an adversary proceeding is aggravated not only by the heavy calendars, but by the fact
that the Judges of the Family Court have no law secretaries or legal assistants....
"Unless legislation is enacted to correct the present imbalance in legal services and to
provide for adequate legal assistance and judicial manpower, there is grave danger that cases
will be dismissed for lack of proper presentation, that citizens will be discouraged from
seeking redress in the court, and that legal questions will not be given adequate considera-
tion. The present situation inevitably results in injury to citizens, to delinquent children,
and to the entire community."
All three models provide for counsel for petitioner. The Model Rules require a civil
officer to represent the petitioner in contested cases. Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 24,
Comment. The Legislative Guide, supra note 8, designates an "appropriate prosecuting
official." Id. § 15(c) & Comment. The Uniform Act allows the judge to request the aid
of a prosecutor. Uniform Act, supra note 8, § 24(b).
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Attorneys who are partisan advocates of the child in the traditional
legal posture also believe that they are acting in the best interests of the
children. 3 Some of them discount the harmful effect of "getting away"
with the offense on the child's attitudes or future conduct. They point
out that there is no empirical evidence that escape from adjudication
leads to further delinquencies.' Others say that, although for some chil-
dren such an escape may be an unfortunate occurrence in ultimate terms,
one cannot have both alternatives if the juvenile court is to function as
part of the general legal system.83
The most important reason for insisting on the role of advocate, how-
ever, is the belief that facilities for treatment and rehabilitation are so
inadequate that the consequences of a finding of delinquency are more
likely to be harmful to the child than to help him.8" If the attorney be-
lieves that the juvenile court cannot play the role of the loving parent, it
is reasonable for him to do the one thing which is within his ability, i.e.,
use every legal means to keep his client from being adjudicated delin-
quent. Under these circumstances, it would be unreasonable to expect
him to shed tears about the court's demise.
Another problem for an attorney in the juvenile court is what to do
when the parent and child have divergent interests."' At the fact-finding
stage, this conflict is likely to arise when the parents allege that the child
is "beyond control," or a "runaway." Is the child "beyond control" or
is he without adequate parental care? In the running away situation, it
may be questionable whether he is disobedient to his parents' reasonable
wishes or escaping from an intolerable situation. The same question of
responsibility can arise when a complaint against a child is made by
someone outside the family. Who is at fault if a child has been absent
from school for twenty-five days with his parents' knowledge? If a feud
between neighbors leads a child to harass the neighbors, assault their
children etc., is the child "guilty" of being beyond parental control?
Counsel cannot adequately represent both the child and the parents in
cases where these questions arise, and he should not attempt to do so.
Because it is so difficult to prove that a child is neglected or without
adequate parental care, this problem should be considered and explored
by counsel.
Information about parent-child relationships may be vital in the dis-
83. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 43, at 52.
84. Lefstein, supra note 60, at 813.
85. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 539.
86. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 43, at 59.
87. Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings,
43 Ind. L.J. 558, 580-81 (1968).
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position stage of a delinquency case, even if it was not considered sig-
nificant at the fact-finding stage.
III. COUNSEL AT DISPOSITION AND BEYOND
A. The Right to Counsel
1. Disposition Hearings
Although the Supreme Court limited its decision in Gault to the
adjudicatory stage of delinquency cases,88 the right to counsel is routinely
extended to dispositions by model laws 9 and state statutes."0 In fact,
attorneys are representing delinquents even in jurisdictions which lack
such statutes.91 The dearth of cases on the issue9" may be partially
88. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
89. See, e.g, Legislative Guide, supra note 8, § 25(a); Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 39;
and Uniform Act, supra note 8, § 26(a).
90. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-6 (Supp. 1969); D.C. Code § 16-2307 (Supp.
1970); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-2418.1 (Supp. 1970); Md. Ann. Code art. 26 § 70-18(d) (Supp.
1970); Minn. Juv. Ct. R. 2-1.1; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-205.06 (1968); N.Y. Family CL Act
§ 741 (McKinney 1963); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-26 (Supp. 1969); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2151-352 (Supp. 1970); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 1109(a) (Supp. 1970); S.D. Compiled
Laws Ann. §§ 26-8-22.1, -8-22.2 (Supp. 1970); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2338-1, § 7-B
(Supp. 1970); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-96 (Supp. 1969).
91. For example, our observations in Affluent County confirmed that whenever counsel
appeared at adjudication, he remained through disposition. Observations in the District of
Columbia also found counsel present at disposition. One reason for the presence of counsel
at disposition is that fact-finding and disposition hearings are held consecutively in many
jurisdictions. For example, in 1969, in the District of Columbia Juvenile Court, only 2051
of the cases were continued for separate dispositional hearings. Kandell, A Study of the
Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia 91 (1970). Therefore, if counsel has been
present at the fact-finding hearing, he is present also at the disposition.
The weight of authority, however, favors separate dispositional hearings. See Legislative
Guide, supra note 8, § 32(d); Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 39; Uniform Act, supra note
8, § 29(b). The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 35 (1967), also urges separate
hearings. However, there is no information currently available showing whether separate
hearings affect the frequency of appearance at disposition.
92. Only one case was found. In re Robert F., 30 App. Div. 2d 933, 293 N.Y.S.2d 873,
(4th Dep't 1968). The appellate court reversed a family court judge's finding that the
juvenile had waived counsel at his dispositional hearing. The relevant facts are as follows:
In spite of statutory provision for counsel at disposition, the New York Law Guardian's
office, which had represented the juvenile at adjudication, was not notified of the disposition
hearing. When the boy and his mother appeared alone in the family court, the judge induced
a clearly involuntary waiver of counsel: "Do you want to speak for yourself," followed by
"Robert, it's up to you," at which point Robert said "Yes." Robert was committed by the
judge, in the face of a caseworker's recommendation of probation. The appellate court
ordered that a new disposition hearing be held, at which the Law Guardian who represented
Robert on the appeal would be assigned to protect Robert's rights.
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explained by the fact that counsel's participation is generally accepted."
At the disposition hearing, the court will decide what should be done
about the delinquent child. Since removal of the child from home and
community is one possible outcome of the hearing, many commentators
feel that disposition is the most critical phase of the juvenile justice
process, and the one in which protection of the juvenile's rights is most
important. 4 In this respect, the juvenile proceeding is analogous to
adult sentencing proceedings. Therefore, it is believed by some that due
process requires representation by counsel-especially where disposition
may be affected by inaccurate assumptions concerning such factors as the
juvenile's rehabilitative potential."
The Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency considers counsel at disposition so important that it recommends
assignment of counsel on request, even if the juvenile waived the right
at adjudication." If, however, counsel at disposition is as vital as the
Council of Judges claims, appointment of counsel only on demand seems
to be inadequate protection of that right. The same reasoning which the
Supreme Court applied to the adjudicatory stage of the proceedings
seems to apply to disposition.
2. Revocation of Probation
Proceedings for revocation of probation and aftercare also involve
both an adjudicatory and a dispositional phase. To date, however, there
has been little interest in the problem of the right to counsel in such
post-dispositional proceedings. Juvenile courts use probation as a dis-
position which allows the child to live in his own home or in the custody
of a suitable person, under supervision of an agent of the court, upon
conditions which the court determines.17 General conditions of probation
include, inter alia, obedience to parents, regular school attendance, keep-
ing early hours, and staying away from undesirable companions. 98 A
probation order can be revoked if the juvenile violates a condition of
93. See Greenspun, Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court, 18 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 599
(1969); Isaacs, The Lawyer in the Juvenile Court, 10 Crim. L.Q. 222, 235 (1968).
94. "I would go so far as to suggest that, consonant with the philosophy of the Juvenile
court, the dispositional phase of the proceeding is the most crucial aspect of the process and
that it is in this phase that adequate protection of the juvenile's rights is most important."
Isaacs, supra note 93, at 235; accord, Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of
Juvenile Law, 1 Family L.Q., Dec., 1967, at 42-43.
95. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 33 (1967).
96. NCCD Council of Judges, Provision of Counsel in Juvenile Courts 17 (1970).
97. Reinemann, Probation and the Juvenile Delinquent, in S. Glueck, The Problem of
Delinquency 610 (1959).
98. Id. at 615.
[Vol. 39
JUVENILE JUSTICE
probation. Probation may also be revoked if the child is "having trouble
adjusting on probation."99 This phrase usually means that the child is
having significant school problems or that family problems have become
so severe that it may be unwise for the child to remain in the home.100
Prior to 1967, probation was generally revoked without a hearing.10'
Nevertheless, a few statutes required that a hearing be held,l"e and
several courts decided that such hearings must conform with the require-
ments of due process."0 3
The Gault decision, including the right to counsel, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Mempa v. Rhay,'1 4 establishing adults' right to
counsel at probation revocation hearings, do not seem to have had a
substantial effect on juvenile probation proceedings. Although all the
model laws now require a court hearing with a right to appointed counsel
before probation can be revoked, °5 only a few post-Gault statutes
require a court hearing,' and the number which unambiguously extend
the right to counsel is even smaller.07
Not one post-Gault judicial decision has been found which holds that
99. Interview with Probation Supervisor, Affluent County Juvenile Court, in Affluent
County, July 28, 1969.
100. One probation review case illustrating such a situation was observed in the Affluent
County Study. The probation worker's reasons for initiating the proceeding were varied.
Emotional deprivation characterizes the home situation, and the step-father does not get
along with the youth or any of the other children in the family. They have moved very
frequently, which has made it impossible for the boy to establish peer relationships. He has
school problems, some of which result from his having obtained master keys to doors and
drawers.
At the hearing the probation officer said that the Pennsylvania Junior Republic would
accept the youth, and both the boy and his mother indicated it was worth a try.
101. Kean, Due Process Applied to Hearings for the Revocation of Juvenile Probation,
16 Juv. Ct. Judges J. 178 (1966).
102. Id. at 181 & n.36.
103. Id. at 181 & n.37.
104. 389 US. 128 (1967). See Skoler, supra note 87, at 570.
105. Legislative Guide, supra note 8, § 39; Model Rules, supra note 8, R. 33 & 39;
Uniform Act, supra note 8, §§ 26, 37. See also NCCD Council of Judges, Provision of
Counsel in Juvenile Courts 12 (1970).
106. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-18 (Supp. 1969); D.C. Code § 16-2309
(1967); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-22 (Supp. 1969); Nl.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-37 (Supp. 1969);
S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 26-8-61 (Supp. 1970); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33 § 659 (Supp.
1970).
107. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-6(c) (Supp. 1969); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-26
(Supp. 1969). Although others, e.g., S.D. Compiled Laws § 26-8-22.1 (Supp. 1970), extend
the right to appointed counsel to "every stage of the proceedings," it is arguable if post-
disposition proceedings are intended to be included, since the proceedings usually are thought
to terminate at disposition. An unambiguous provision is the Uniform Act, supra note 8,
§ 26 ("at all stages of any proceedings under this Act").
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probation revocation proceedings require Gault protections in the ab-
sence of statute.08 In some cases, however, where the revocation pro-
ceedings occurred before Gault, the courts intimated that the right to
counsel would be extended upon presentation of a proper case.109 In a
few jurisdictions, hearings are held even though the statute is silent.110
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to discover how extensive the
practice is, or whether the right to counsel is extended to revocation of
probation,"' because court statistics do not identify probation revoca-
tion cases." 2
108. NCCD Council of Judges, Provision of Counsel in Juvenile Courts 12 (1970), cited
White v. State, 457 P.2d 650 (Alas. 1969), as holding that a probation revocation proceeding
comes within the Gault counsel requirement. The court's language indeed supports such
an extension: "[T]he ruling in Gault ... requires as a matter of due process that counsel
be provided to a juvenile in any proceeding which may result in commitment to an institu-
tion . . ." 457 P.2d at 653. The precise question at issue, however, was the adequacy of
counsel at the adjudication hearing; no probation revocation was involved.
One case termed a probation revocation proceeding by the Utah Supreme Court appears
to say that notice of the right to appointed counsel and an inquiry as to whether sufficient
resources are available is not required in such proceedings. Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d
229, 231, 443 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1968). However, the case is confusing for two reasons. The
first reason is that the court's designation of the proceedings as probation revocation Is
erroneous. Facts show that the appellant juvenile had been committed to an institution and
released to the custody of his mother; therefore, his "probation" was actually "parole," or
"aftercare" as it is called in juvenile courts. Secondly, it is unclear whether the court's hold-
ing that the juvenile was not deprived of counsel because he had been advised of his right
to representation indicates that the court was of the opinion that notice of the right to
appointed counsel is not required in post-adjudication cases, or whether It thinks such
notice is not required in any juvenile case (which would, of course, violate Gault). The
dissent makes it clear that notice of the right to appointed counsel is absent from the tran-
script, as is any inquiry about financial ability to afford counsel. Id. at 233, 443 P.2d at
1022-23.
109. Suit v. Weber, 210 So. 2d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Another Florida case
denied Gault's applicability on the grounds that the time of the probation revocation peti-
tion, which preceded the Gault opinion by two weeks, determined whether Gault must be
applied retroactively, even though the actual bearing was held the day after the Gault
opinion issued. See Richardson v. Milton, 219 So. 2d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
110. Prior to the revision of the 1970 District of Columbia juvenile code, probation revo-
cation proceedings were not required by statute but hearings nevertheless were held. "No
formal petition is brought; nor is formal notice of the charge furnished to the child in
advance of the hearing. He is simply notified to report at a specified time." Kandell, A
Study of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia 93 (1970). Our observations in
Affluent County showed that probation revocation hearings are held in that jurisdiction.
111. The juvenile was informed of his right to counsel at probation revocation hearings
in the District of Columbia when there was a possibility of commitment. Id.
112. Statistics were examined in juvenile courts located in twelve different states. Seven
reports made no mention of probation revocation. These were from Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin. In two of the remaining five
reports, the expression "violation of court order," which may include violation of probation,
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The lack of interest in probation revocation proceedings may be ex-
plained by the possibility that most probation revocation cases have been
handled as ordinary delinquency adjudications.' 3 Prior to Gault and
Winship, there was little reason to have different procedures for new
offenders and those who were on probation. Because of the protections
established by these cases, however, it may become more difficult to
obtain adjudications of delinquency. For example, it may be hard to
prove that a fifteen year old boy on probation, found at midnight in a
stolen car with friends who were also on probation, participated in the
stealing of this car. It may, however, be relatively easy to show that he
violated probation conditions concerning hours and associates. The use
of probation revocation proceedings therefore may increase, with the
issue of the right to counsel at these proceedings becoming much more
significant.
3. Revocation of Aftercare Status
Aftercare status 114 is the juvenile equivalent of adult parole. Revoca-
tion of the status is similar to probation revocation, because it is applied
when a new offense is committed or when an aftercare condition is
violated.115 Traditionally, the institution in which the juvenile is confined
is the only referral reason specified. These states were Colorado and Illinois. In Georgia,
Oregon and Virginia, court reports combined violations of probation and parole for sta-
tistical purposes.
113. The court reports in Colorado and Illinois list respectively a total of 40 and 203
"violations of court orders," representing 2.0% of the total volume of business of each court.
The range of percentages in the three states combining probation and parole violations
were as follows: Georgia, 0.7%; Oregon, 0.5%; and Virginia, 1.2%. From the very small
number of cases reported, it would appear likely that violations of probation handled by
these courts are violations of conditions of probation rather than law violations of
juveniles on probation, which are reported under the appropriate delinquency category
(e.g, auto theft, burglary, etc.).
114. Some experts in the juvenile justice area define "aftercare" as any action which
occurs after disposition. Thus, commitment under this definition is part of aftercare. The
more common definition of aftercare, and the one used in this article, describes the status of
a juvenile who has been released from an institution but is still subject to the jurisdiction of
the court.
115. For example, the District of Columbia's "Expectations of Aftercare" form lists
the following "expectations" or conditions:
"A. General Expectations:
"1. Obey all laws, ordinances, and regulations of the District of Columbia.
"2. Obey your parents or guardian.
"3. Keep your appointments with your caseworker and follow the worker's advice and
instructions.
"4. Report any change of address to your caseworker within 48 hours.
"5. Adhere to an acceptable daily plan of activity:
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or the state agency which administers these institutions n1 is responsible
for establishing aftercare conditions and deciding to revoke the status.
Neither the model acts nor the post-Gault statutes provide for judicial
hearings on aftercare revocation,117 indicating that aftercare is outside
the juvenile court process. By rule, however, at least one state requires
a judicial hearing before aftercare status is revoked, and includes the
right to appointed counsel.1 18
Courts also seem to be of the opinion that neither a right to counsel
nor a judicial hearing are required in revocation proceedings. Two state
courts have recently upheld the validity of administrative proceedings,
in spite of the juvenile's claims that due process safeguards-including
the right to counsel-should apply.
In one case, In re Loyd," 9 a proceeding to revoke aftercare was
initiated because the juvenile "was allegedly involved in an incident" at
his high school.120 An administrative hearing was held before the state
Youth Conservation Commission, which is permitted by statute to revoke
aftercare whenever it believes that this action is desirable.121 The juve-
nile was allowed to testify at the hearing, but neither his parent nor his
attorney was allowed to be present.1 22 The hearing resulted in the re-
vocation of his "parole" and recommitment to the institution.
a. If you are enrolled in school, attend regularly unless you have been excused for a
valid reason.
b. If you are in the employment market, you must work, or demonstrate to your
caseworker that you are exerting reasonable effort in seeking regular employment.
"6. Do not leave the metropolitan area of Washington, D. C. without permission of your
caseworker.
"7. Adhere to curfew hours agreed upon by your caseworker and your parents or
guardian.
a. Your curfew hours are
"B. Special Expectations:
The above expectations of aftercare have been explained to me by my caseworker and I
agree to conduct myself in accordance with the expectations that have been set up to guide
me.
Agreement to be signed by juvenile, parents and caseworker."
See also the aftercare agreement in Bernier v. State, 265 A.2d 604, 605 n.2 (Me. 1970),
appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1970) (No. 877).
116. Many statutes grant administrators authority to revoke aftercare at their discretion.
E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1608 (Supp. 1970); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 2716
(Supp. 1970); W. Va. Code Ann. § 28-1-6 (1966).
117. However, a few pre-Gault statutes provide for judicial hearings at aftercare revoca-
tion. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 13 § 361 (1958); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-210 (Supp. 1970).
118. Md. Rules of Procedure 915, 918 (Supp. 1970).
119. 177 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. 1970).
120. Id. at 556.
121. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 242.19 (Supp. 1970). The commission may "order reconfinement
. as often as [the] commission believes ... desirable."
122. 177 N.W.2d at 556. However, the parent and a retained attorney were allowed
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On appeal, the juvenile claimed that, under Gault and Mempa v. Rhay,
he was entitled to court appointed counsel at a revocation hearing.M
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that
neither decision applied to aftercare revocation proceedings. The prin-
cipal reason for denying the request, however, seemed to be fear that
officials might not grant early parole if all due process protections are
required whenever parole violation is suspected.""'
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine also handed down an aftercare
revocation opinion in 1970. In Bernier v. State," the court went even
further than Minnesota in its approval of administrative discretion, hold-
ing that revocation decisions were within the sole discretion of the institu-
tion superintendent. In Bernier, a youth was returned to an institution
sixteen months after his release, solely because he had been questioned by
the police about the theft of some green stamps from a local store. No
formal charges were brought against him, and no hearing of any kind
was held about either the missing stamps or any possible violation of
aftercare rules. 26 The juvenile contended that revocation without a
hearing was a denial of equal protection and due process. The court re-
jected this argument on the basis that the Superintendent may return a
child to the institution at his discretion, because he has by statute "all
the power of a guardian to his ward, and of parents over their child. 
127
Having noted that the Superintendent has plenary authority to return
the child when he is "'satisfied at any time that the welfare of the child
will be promoted by return to the center,' ""8 the court asked: 'What
does it matter whether the child was or was not guilty of a particular
offense?"" 9
One need not believe that all Gault protections should apply to after-
care revocations to be appalled by these decisions. They uphold depriva-
tion of liberty under a proceeding which completely lacks fundamental
fairness.
to consult with an official of the Youth Conservation Commission for one half hour prior to
the hearing.
123. The other rights asserted were: (1) "Notice of any alleged violation of law;" (2)
"A fact hearing on the allegations;" (3) "Confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
nesses;" (4) "Presentation of evidence in his own behalf;" (5) '"inimal demands of due
process, including presumption of innocence, burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
and bal." Id. at 556.
124. Id. at 558. See also Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1968)
(discussed in note 108 supra), where the court also expressed concern that requiring all due
process safeguards would discourage authorities from granting release.
125. 265 A.2d 604 (Me. 1970), appeal docketed, 39 US.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1970)
(No. 877).
126. Id. at 604-05.
127. Id. at 606.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 607.
1971]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
It is unconvincing to argue that, because of the rehabilitative pur-
pose of institutionalization, notice of the reasons for revocation and an
opportunity to contest them are unnecessary. Is it rehabilitative for a
child to be told that he is given his liberty on the condition that he abide
by certain rules, but that he may lose it even if he keeps them? Is it
rehabilitative to tell a child that he is being institutionalized to help rather
than to punish him, when an unproved charge of improper conduct is
the cause of his return to the institution? Such practices suggest punish-
ment rather than treatment and rehabilitation. These court opinions
make it clear that juvenile delinquents who are committed to an institu-
tion lose, for an unspecified number of years, the protections of the
average citizen against deprivation of liberty.
B. The Role of Counsel: In General
Views concerning the proper role of counsel vary even more at dis-
position than at adjudication. Some attorneys think that their duty has
ended at adjudication 30 Others see their role as advocates and the pro-
bation officer as an adversary, and contest every assertion made in the
social study in an effort to discredit its writer and recommendations.1"'
A less combative role is envisioned by those who see the attorney as
"validating" the work of the experts. A lawyer-familiar with the family,
trained to analyze, and experienced in cross-examination-can ensure
that the disposition will be based on reliable facts and valid conclusions. 182
Others believe that the attorney should actively participate in the
formulation of a proper treatment plan' 33 by presenting the strengths
of the child and family in the most favorable light, or by suggesting
potential dispositions that may not have come to the attention of the
judge or the probation department.' Still others are of the opinion that
130. Greenspun, Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court, 18 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 599, 606
(1969) ; Comment, The Role of the Attorney in the Treatment Phase of the Juvenile Court
Process, 12 St. Louis U.L.J. 659 (1968). Those who espouse no counsel role justify their
position "by saying that the attorney is not a social worker and cannot add anything to
the proceeding which depends heavily on the social report." Comment, The Attorney and
the Dispositional Process, 12 St. Louis U.L.J. 644, 646 (1968).
131. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 43, at 59, describing the position of New York City's
Law Guardians, whose principal purpose at disposition is to prevent placement away from
the home. See also Comment, The Attorney and the Dispositional Process, supra note 130, at
651.
132. L. Arthur, Counsel for the Child 28, 29 (1966) ; Task Force Report, supra note 91,
at 33; Johnston, The Function of Counsel in Juvenile Court, 7 Osgoode Hall L.J. 199, 207
(1970); Comment, The Attorney and the Dispositional Process, supra note 130, at 648-49.
133. Task Force Report, supra note 91, at 33. See also J. Irving, On Going into Juvenile
Court 5 (1967); Johnston, supra note 132, at 205; Comment, In Re Gault and the Persist-
ing Questions of Procedural Due Process and Legal Ethics in Juvenile Courts, 47 Neb. L.
Rev. 558, 591 (1968).
134. NCCD Council of Judges, Provision of Counsel in Juvenile Courts 16 (1970). A
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counsel should be replaced by professionally trained non-lawyers operat-
ing in an adversary juvenile justice system.' 35
To a large extent, these different views reflect the attorney's judgment
about many aspects of the juvenile justice system, although his opinion
about the rehabilitative potential of the system is usually considered the
principal variable in determining his role.
For example, the New York Law Guardians do not believe that there
is any value in the dispositional alternatives available to most courts. In
fact, they often exhibit a fixed determination to avoid any placement
for their clients.'36 It is their view, therefore, that the juvenile court is
not an agency for salvation, but rather the instrument of corruption. "It
is no longer a gateway to needed services but a court for dealing with
'offenders for whom vigorous measures seem necessary.' ,,13 It has been
observed that the Law Guardians tend to resist almost any juvenile court
disposition.1 38
Those attorneys who believe that the court has facilities 3 ' to help
the child obtain his rights "to live in a decent home, to be in the custody
of someone who understands and cares for him, to be supervised and
disciplined, to have a chance for an education and a job, and to live in
a community that will give him the opportunity to develop into a self-
respecting, productive, and law-abiding citizen,"'140 are apt to cooperate
survey of probation officers showed that 78% of those responding believe that the attorney's
role at disposition should include presenting alternative treatment plans. Brennan & Ware,
The Probation Officer's Perception of the Attorney's Role in Juvenile Court, 16 Crime &
Delinq. 172, 174 (1970).
135. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and
Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 7, 39-44.
136. H. Makover, Mental Health Services in the Family Court of the State of New York
in the City of New York 122-23 (1966) (footnote to Appendix A). The author reports
that Law Guardians "also urge psychiatric examinations to delay or to avoid placement in
the State Training Schools. The law guardians reason that since a BMHS study takes six
to eight weeks to complete, the judge may parole a child to his home rather than remand
him to Youth House for such a period of time." Id.
137. Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 Sup. CL
Rev. 233, 246.
138. "The law guardian's actions at the disposition hearing appear to be aimed at pre-
venting disposition-any disposition within the jurisdiction of the court . . . ." Snyder &
Mangano, Effect of Law Guardian Representation on the Treatment of Delinquent Children,
13 Soc. Work, July, 1968, at 102, 105.
139. "In the State of Minnesota the conclusion [of the Crime Commission that there are
no facilities] is utterly false, and Minnesota is not unique." Arthur, A Revised Philosophy of
the Juvenile Court, 18 Juv. Ct. Judges J. 31 (1967). See also Greenspun, Role of the
Attorney in Juvenile Court, 18 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 599, 607-08 nnA7 & 48 (1969), for a
description of resources in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
140. Noyes, Has Gault Changed the Juvenile Court Concept?, 16 Crime & Delinq. 158,
160 (1970).
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in the formulation of a treatment plan once its validity has been es-
tablished.
Many factors other than the assessment of the rehabilitative potential
of the court probably influence the position adopted by the attorney at
disposition. For example, it might be important that the average ad-
judicated delinquent is given merely a warning, or at most is put on
probation, rather than being sent to an institution for the remainder of
his minority. Although the fact situation in the Gault case may give the
contrary impression, the vast majority of juveniles are not committed
to institutions, 14' and children sent to institutions are usually released in
six to ten months. 142
It might also be important that the attorney sees the child as a "good
kid" with little or no criminal record, or a troubled child who needs help,
rather than a dangerous offender who commits crimes which drive peo-
ple off the street, or one who has already shown himself resistant to
non-coercive rehabilitative efforts. 43
The attorney's belief in his capability to make the "social" decisions
required at disposition, together with his interest in making them, may
141. The Children's Bureau reports that of the 811,000 cases disposed of by juvenile
courts in the United States in 1967, 382,100 of these cases (47%) were handled judicially,
while 428,900 (53%) were handled non-judicially. Children's Bureau, Juvenile Court
Statistics 9 (1967). 74,000 children were admitted to public training schools that year, but
only 4,000 of them were being committed for the first time. Ten thousand additional children
were committed to forestry camps, 6,000 of whom were first commitments.
See also Probation Dep't, County of Los Angeles, Biennial Report 33 (1965-1967), which
reports that in the fiscal year 1967 approximately 30% of juvenile court cases were placed
outside the home. However, 12% of those placed were listed as "undetermined at the
initial hearing," raising the possibility that some of these children remained at home. Only
2% of the total cases were committed to the California Youth Authority (the state juvenile
correctional facility). Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public
Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 Ind. L.J. 619, 638 (1968), tabulated the dispositions in
"Metro's" Juvenile Court for 1960-1967, showing that about 15% of those children for
whom petitions are filed are ordered institutionalized.
142. "In 1967, 50% of the public institutions for delinquent children had average lengths
of stay of 8 months or less, 26% of 9 months to 1 year, and 24% of 1 year or more. For
training schools alone, the average length of stay in 1967 was approximately 10 months.
Forestry camps and reception centers had average lengths of stay of 6 months and 3 months,
respectively." Children's Bureau, Statistics on Public Institutions for Delinquent Children 2
(1967).
A survey undertaken by the NCCD in 1966, at the request of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, found that the nationwide average
length of stay in state training schools is nine months. NCCD, Juvenile Institutions, 13
Crime & Delinq. 80 (1967).
In Affluent County, the average length of time spent in training schools is much lower,
ranging from 5 to 6 months. Interview with Mr. C., Probation Officer of Affluent County,
July 22, 1969.
143. Commission Report, supra note 42, at 88. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 554-55.
1971] JUVENILE JUSTICE
also be important. Some attorneys do not want to feel that they are social
workers or psychiatrists,1" while others believe that they can educate
themselves or receive special training to examine expert witnesses and
otherwise perform the social functions required in the juvenile court. 140
The attorney's view of the relationship between the parent and the
child may also influence his position at disposition. In this respect, it is
important whether he regards their interests as identical, 40 or regards
them as parties with separate and perhaps conflicting interests. 4 7
Finally, the attorney's role will be greatly affected if he believes that
status offenders should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court because the acts are not offenses against society,148 or if he feels
that status offenses are forerunners of delinquency which indicate that
the child needs assistance.' 49
Unfortunately, there is no empirical data available on the number of
attorneys at disposition, their role at disposition, or the reasons which
led them to adopt a particular role.' 0 Also lacking is information con-
cerning the validity of the assumptions which may have influenced the
attorney's choice of role.
An effort was made to obtain this information by examining the ac-
tivities of counsel in Affluent County. Court records were also analyzed,
in an attempt to acquire information about children and their families
in both counsel and non-counsel cases.
144. Levin, The Role of the Lawyer in Juvenile Proceedings, 39 Pa. Bar Ass'n Q. 427,
436 (1968). One observer has noted that "it was the rare attorney who had the resources
and training to challenge competently a given dispositional recommendation." Cayton, Rela-
tionship of the Probation Officer and the Defense Attorney After Gault, 37 Fed. Probation
8, 11 (March 1970). See also Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in
Juvenile Court Proceedings, 43 Ind. L.J. 558, 581 (1968).
145. Johnston, The Function of Counsel in Juvenile Court, 7 Osgoode Hall L.J. 199,
207 (1970).
146. A 1963 Survey of juvenile court judges probed who was represented most often in
court. 52% of the responding judges indicated the "child and parents jointly," demon-
strating a belief in their unity of interests. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in
juvenile Court, 4 J. Family Law 77, 82-83 (1964).
147. Levin, supra note 144, at 431-32; Virginia Lawyers, Judges, Discuss Juvenile Court
Practice Since Gault, 6 Crim. L. Rep. 2128, 2129 (Nov. 12, 1969); Comment, The Attorney-
Parent Relationship in the Juvenile Court, 12 St. Louis U.LJ. 603, 619-22 (1968).
148. See Commission Report, supra note 42, at 85; Comment, Statutory Vagueness in
Juvenile Law: The Supreme Court and Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 143,
150 (1969).
149. See Fox, juvenile justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1187,
1190-91 (1970); Reasons, Gault: Procedural Change and Substantive Effect, 16 Crime &
Delinq. 163 (1970). 'Tart of the rationale for the establishment of the juvenile court was
the belief that delinquency can be prevented through state action. Certain types of be-
havior--smoking, truancy, drinking, etc.-were believed to initiate a criminal career." Id.
at 164.
150. For data on the presence of counsel, see note 65 supra.
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C. The Role of Counsel in Affluent County
Initially, court records were surveyed to determine how many children
were represented by counsel at disposition. They showed that counsel
was present in 31 (27%) of the 113 cases examined.15' As the following
percentages illustrate, there were fewer commitments to institutions and
more findings of "not involved" when the child was represented by
counsel.
TABLE B
Examination of Court Records
Counsel Present Counsel Absent
Disposition No. of Cases Percent No. of Cases Percent
Dismissed-Not Involved 4 12.25 6 7.31
Dismissed 0 0 3 3.65
Held Open-Later Dismissed 3 9.67 8 9.75
Probation 20 64.51 48 58.53
Committed-Institution 3 9.67 15 18.29
Committed-Agency 1 3.22 2 2.43
TOTALS 31 99.32 82 99.96
Since no other data about the role of counsel could be found in the
court records, sixty-four court hearings were observed in order to obtain
such data.'52 Twenty-four (37.5%) of the sixty-four children in the
observed sample had counsel 53 at the adjudicatory phase, and two addi-
tional children had counsel at disposition. Most of the children repre-
sented by counsel denied the offense, while the opposite was true in the
other cases. These figures seem to indicate that Affluent County attorneys
are adopting the role of advocates. Neither advocacy nor the presence
of counsel seems to be related to court action at adjudication, however,
since of the thirteen children who were represented by counsel and de-
nied the charge, only two (15.4%) were dismissed as not involved,
while four (30.7%) of the children without counsel obtained dismissal.' 4
151. The sample of formal cases represented 15% (126 cases) of all cases petitioned
during 1968 for which dispositions had been made by May 8, 1969-the date the sample
was drawn. The cases were drawn for the sample by using a table of random numbers.
152. See note 21 supra.
153. The observed cases were heard more than a year after the formal cases. The higher
percentage of children represented by counsel is perhaps explained by the fact that counsel
representation is increasing.
154. In fact, the percentage of children without counsel who were dismissed might be
higher than has been indicated. Three children who made no plea were counted as not
involved.
A few other studies have explored the relationship between the presence of counsel and
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Therefore, if counsel plays a significant role in delinquency hearings in
this county, it is at the dispositional stage of the proceedings.
The dispositions of the observed cases, as illustrated in the following
table, were not severe.
TABLE C
Observation of Court Hearings: Counsel Present
Disposition No. of Cases Percent
Dismissed-Not Involved 2 8.33
Dismissed-With Restitution 2 8.33
Held Open-Later Dismissed 1 4.16
Probation 17 70.83
Committed-Institution 1 4.16
Committed-Agency 1 4.16
TOTAL 24 99.97
What did counsel do to achieve this result? The answer in sixteen
(66 31 %) of the cases is that he did absolutely nothing. In other words,
counsel was present but did not participate by asking questions or making
any statement in these cases.
This lack of participation is not due to the use of appointed counsel.
Many of the juveniles were represented by retained counsel, and there
was no difference in the amount of participation. Only two attorneys
represented more than one child, and in each case they represented two
siblings. Thus the findings are not attributable to the conduct of only
one or two attorneys.
The actions of counsel in the remaining eight cases can be divided into
three groups. The first consists of five cases in which the information
offered by counsel was almost wholly limited to either the juvenile's be-
haviour or attitudes with regard to the offense (e.g., willingness to make
restitution;... cooperation with the police), or to the socio-economic
status of his family.'56 In none of these cases was information con-
dismissal. See, e.g., Reasons, Gault: Procedural Change and Substantive Effect, 16 Crime
& Delinq. 163, 170 (1970), which indicates that over 25% of the post-Gault counsel cases
in one Ohio county were dismissed, as opposed to about 105 of the non-counsel cases. See
also Zeite & Medalie, Judicial Conference Committee on Law Pertaining to Mental Dis-
orders; Dispositions of Mentally Disordered Juvenile Delinquents in the District of Co-
lumbia-The Problems of Diagnosis and Treatment 20 (1968).
155. Restitution was not, in fact, made in any of these cases until the court ordered it,
and in one case the father protested the amount of $90.00 for replacement of an antique
gun which the boy had sold.
156. One family was described as "prominent," another as "providing a most suitable
environment," and in another case the father was described as an unemployed corporation
executive.
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tributed by counsel, the parents, or the youth concerning the child's
school record, his relationship with family or friends, or his mental
condition.57
Presumably, counsel was either of the opinion that no treatment was
needed or that it was not his place to suggest it. The judge, however,
thought that treatment was needed in at least three" 8 of the cases, since
he placed the boys on probation. 59 In the other two cases, the boys were
dismissed but restitution was orderedl'0 -- ninety dollars for the theft
of a gun, and a forty dollar hospital bill in an assault case. The boy in-
volved in the assault case was returned to court a few months later on
another charge of assaulting the same girl.161
In two cases, counsel and the family gave information about the boy
which could be helpful to the judge in forming a treatment plan. The
plan recommended by counsel for a seventeen year old boy who sold
LSD was that he be allowed to join his family, which was moving out
of the state, and that he continue therapy in the new community. Al-
though the family had reportedly started therapy in Affluent County,
no diagnostic or progress report was offered, nor was it clear how long
treatment had been in progress. No other information about the boy or
his family relationship was mentioned, except that the father felt that
the many moves required by his work had caused the boy difficulty.102
Counsel said that the boy had voluntarily cooperated with the police by
pointing out locations where drugs were being sold. Our follow-up in-
vestigation, however, revealed that the boy had given the police false
information.
In the other case, counsel had arranged for a psychological evaluation
of a fifteen year old first offender, who was charged with burglary and
157. The court did not have this information from other sources because this was the
first disposition hearing for all five of these children. The usual procedure In such cases is
to put the child on temporary probation or to hold the case open until the social study is
completed unless the case is dismissed.
158. In one of these cases restitution was also required.
159. In one of these cases probation would have been impractical, because the boy had
entered the army between the offense and the hearing. Also, he was almost 18-the age at
which the court usually closes cases.
160. This was a confusing disposition, since the offense was clearly admitted and resti-
tution was in effect "the penalty." The advantage for the child, of course, Is the fact that
he has no record, since there is no adjudication of delinquency. From the view of obtaining
the most favorable disposition, counsel's action was successful.
161. The follow-up study conducted a year later also showed that two boys did not
have another petition filed. The other two boys, including the "dismissed with restitution"
case, were no longer of juvenile court age.
162. Although the attorney asked for probation without verdict, the judge said the of-
fense was too serious for this disposition. The boy was given a suspended commitment to
the training school. (The judge said he would have committed him if the family had not
been leaving the state.)
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destroying a mailbox with explosives. Other information about the boy
included the following facts: The parents had not had prior difficulties
with him; he cooperated with the police; and he almost lost his arm from
the mailbox explosion. The attorney suggested probation on condition
of psychotherapy as a result of the evaluation.ea
Three attorneys who represented youngsters in court also participated
in the formation of a disposition plan. In each case, however, their only
contribution was to disagree with the plan proposed by the diagnostic
facility. None of the attorneys had examined the diagnostic report, nor
did they request an opportunity to do so. In fact, one of them said the
child should have a psychiatric evaluation, although the disposition
hearing took place the very day he returned from a 30-day stay at a
diagnostic facility, where he had not only had a psychiatric evaluation,
but psychological, medical, and school evaluations as well.
Removal from the home to a residential treatment facility was recom-
mended for two of these three boys and was ordered by the court despite
the attorneys' objections."° The recommendation for the third boy was
that he be placed in a group home for adolescent boys to receive psycho-
therapy. The court was unable to carry out the placement recommenda-
tion because the home accepts boys only if parents will participate in
group meetings and the parents in this case were unwilling to do so."
The court did, however, make psychotherapy a condition of probation. '
163. The court adopted counsel's recommendation, but the follow-up study conducted
three months later showed that the family had not made the arrangements for therapy.
The probation officer assumed that the judge requested therapy with the therapist who had
made the diagnosis. The father said he would pick his own therapist but did not, nor did
he sign the forms necessary to allow the boy to participate in group therapy sessions at a
public agency. The social file also showed that the boy's sister was on probation, and that
her probation officer had found the family uncooperative.
164. In both of these cases the parents had voluntarily placed the children outside of
the home for a period of years when they were less than nine years of age. The remarks
below summarize the history of one of these boys.
R, at age 8, was brought to court by his parents as beyond parental control for repeated
runaways. He had lived with his grandmother from his infancy until shortly before the
court action. (The parents had given up another child for adoption at six months of age.)
He was sent to the diagnostic center because the parents did not want to pay for an evalu-
ation. The center's recommendation was for placement in a residential treatment center. The
court substituted probation with psychotherapy. Psychotherapy was never provided, and
the case was dosed after a few months because there was no further difficulty and the
parents were uncooperative. The present court appearance was three years later and involved
a series of thefts by R, his 10 year old brother and another child, amounting to several
thousand dollars. The new evaluation at the diagnostic center found him more disturbed
than before and the parents still uncooperative.
165. Note that both probation officer and diagnostic center agreed that the parents were
uncooperative and the root of the difficulty. In fact, the diagnostic facility believed the boy
should not even be returned to the home to await placement.
166. The follow-up study showed that the youth and his family were in therapy.
1971]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The majority of attorneys who represented delinquents in the observed
cases seemed to operate on the assumption that they had no role at dis-
position. Even when the attorney did participate, information about the
child's problem and its possible solution was given to the court in only
a few instances. From this study, it appears that counsel in Affluent
County-with rare exceptions-regard themselves as advocates, whose
primary allegiance is to the parent rather than to the child.
It was not possible to determine the reasons for each attorney's choice
of role. 67 Data was, however, available concerning delinquents and their
treatment in the county, and this data casts doubt on the validity of
the assumptions underlying many of the attorney's role decisions. The
data was derived from a study of 126 court cases. Information was ob-
tained about the typical delinquent's socio-economic background, family
relationships, court treatment, and rate of recidivism.
The average delinquent in Affluent County is a fifteen year old white
male 6 ' who lives with both of his parents in a house purchased by them.
Family income is usually in excess of ten thousand dollars a year,09 and
more than half of the delinquents live in homes whose value exceeds
twenty-eight thousand dollars. 70 There was no "typical offense." Prop-
erty crimes were committed by 427 of the children, 30% were status
offenders, and 28% were involved in crimes against the person.
The court received diagnostic information about the child's mental
condition in almost half of the cases,' in contrast to most juvenile
courts, which have such data available on only ten percent of their
children. 2 Only six percent of these children were diagnosed as mentally
167. The public defender's office reported that there are few "bum raps" in the court,
and this belief may be one of the reasons for the passivity of counsel. It was also said that
frequently he was called to court on a few hours notice. However, our observations showed
that whenever a child requested counsel at the hearing, the case was continued to a later
date. Interview with Affluent County Public Defender, in Affluent County, July 14, 1969.
168. The formal rather than the informal cases were used for this purpose. They com-
prised a larger group, and we were able to follow them for a longer period of time.
169. Unfortunately, the court does not keep any systematic economic data on the chil-
dren. Their stated reason is that family income is almost always over $10,000 a year. How-
ever, we found a number of cases in which the family was on welfare, and others where it
was doubtful from the information on parents' occupations that the income was that high.
Therefore, we estimated family income on the basis of housing.
170. Housing information was obtained by examining county records compiled by the
tax assessor to obtain assessed values of houses. These values are approximately 55% of the
"real" value of houses in the county.
171. Thirty-one of the children were sent to the state diagnostic facility for 30-day ob-
servations, and 21 were examined in the community. Both judges said that more children
could be examined in the community instead of the state facility if sufficient resources were
available.
172. Task Force Report, supra note 95, at 81.
The President's Crime Commission reported that less than one-half of the juvenile courts
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ill or retarded. I" Although the number of children in the sample who
were seriously disturbed is quite small, the rate of parent pathology
is much higher. Twenty-seven percent of the parents were described as
mentally ill or alcoholic and there were additional cases in which there
was no data on a parent because the parent refused to be interviewed,
had no contact with the child, etc.
The average juvenile in the sample was referred to court at least twice
and forty-five percent of them were referred three or more times. 14
More than one-third of the recidivists began their court careers as status
offenders, usually for running away or truancy. The fact that these
children's violations changed from status to delinquency cannot be at-
tributed to the detrimental effects of institutionalization because these
children were not removed from their homes. In fact, the first disposi-
tion was often only a warning, or "held open without finding," which
means that the case is dismissed a few months later if there are no
additional referrals.
No one can determine with certainty the exact reason for the repeated
referral of these children to court, but parental failure to carry out treat-
ment recommendations was found in a fairly high percentage of cases.
In our formal sample, the court made recommendations for treatment of
the parent and/or the child in eighty-three cases. In twenty-six (31%) of
these cases, the parents did not carry out these recommendations."" The
children whose parents did not carry out the recommendations invariably
turned out to be the same children who were eventually referred to court
three or more times. Frequently, as might be expected, these children
were also the ones whose parents were described as mentally ill or
alcoholic.
Their progress towards rehabilitation after disposition does not seem
to be retarded so much by a dearth of dispositional alternatives as it is
by the failure to use them. When first referred to court, these children
are quite young, averaging only 12.3 years of age, and do not have set
delinquency patterns. Probation, supplemented in some instances with
responding to a survey received psychological examination data for more than 105 of their
formal cases. Only 27% of the courts received such data for more than one-fifth of their
cases. Psychiatric data was even less frequently received by the courts--only 135o reported
receiving such information for more than 20% of their formal cases.
173. The diagnoses were taken from the court reports of the diagnostic facility and were
independently reviewed by this project's consulting psychiatrist, Donald Hayes Russell, M.D.
174. When these cases were followed up one year later, twenty-five percent of the three-
or-more time reddivists had been returned to court again.
175. For examples of failures to carry out treatment, see notes 163 and 164 supra. For a
detailed description of two other cases where the parents obstructed and refused to cooperate
with the court's treatment plans, and where the boys' delinquencies multiplied, see Webb,
A Probation Officer Speaks Out: Treatment Referrals of Delinquent Children, 20 Juv. Ct.
judges J. 138 (1969).
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family counseling and in others with individual or family therapy, would
be sufficient for many of them. When such treatment was used, few
subsequent referrals to court were found.
However, where the families failed to follow through or were actively
resistent to treatment for themselves or for the child, frequently the
case was soon closed because the parents were "uncooperative." The
court has the authority to order therapy and require the parents to pay
for it to the extent of their ability to do so, and court orders were found
making psychotherapy a condition of probation. The records; however,
showed no indication of action by the probation officer or a judge when
the parent did not follow the order.
The judges said that they have the authority to remove the child from
the home when parents are indifferent and uncooperative, and that they
not only threaten such parents, but also sometimes remove the children.
The records showed, however, that even when the child was removed,
the action had been recommended much earlier by the diagnostic center
or probation authorities. Removal itself took place only when the child
was referred to court for additional delinquencies, and it was the safety
of the community rather than the rights of the child which seemed to
be the stimulus for the removal.
When children are removed from home at a fairly late stage of de-
linquency, there are substantial dispositional problems. Less facilities
are available for older children. Moreover, those that exist are geared
more to the needs of the child who has just started to have trouble and
who needs guidance in a relatively free atmosphere.170
The case of Buddy illustrates some of the problems found in many of
the recidivists' cases. Between the ages of eight and fourteen, Buddy
was referred to the court eight times for at least twenty offenses, includ-
ing more than a dozen burglaries. He was warned, put on probation,
kept on probation, committed to a state institution for delinquents, re-
leased, warned, committed again, and released again. One might say
that those who felt Buddy could be helped had an "overoptimistic view
of . . . juvenile criminality and of what even a fully equipped juvenile
court could do about it."'
1 77
176. One complaint of the director of Affluent County's boys home, a group residential
home with community orientation, is that by the time the probation officer decldes the
home situation is unsuitable for the child, a short term group facility such as a boy's home
is inappropriate. Interview with Director of Group Home, in Affluent County, July 16,
1970.
An indication of the extent of the use of residential facilities other than state training
schools may be seen from a summary of a recent Affluent Court Probation Department
report. As of August, 1970, a total of 33 juveniles were placed in 14 different facilities, 7
of which were located out of state.
177. Commission Report, supra note 42, at 80.
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A look at Buddy's social record shows a somewhat different picture.
He was sent to the state diagnostic center for a thirty-day evaluation
at age ten, when he was referred to court for the second time. The center
described him as an anxious, possibly frightened child, showing rather
mild neurotic trends, who functioned in the bright-normal range but with
his potential in the "very superior range."
The center described the home as follows:
Father punishes child by tying him up with chains by neck or feet and whipping
him with wires and belts. He once chained him in his room for six days. The paternal
grandfather approves of these punishments and calls Buddy "dog" when he is tied
up. The mother on these occasions does nothing. Parents presumably don't get along
but won't discuss it. Without radical changes in the whole constellation of emotional
and other forces in this family, the boy's problems and his acting out will increase.
Placement in a group home was recommended because of the father's
sadistic inclinations and unwillingness to accept outside help. Home
placement, if used at all, was recommended only on a trial basis and
only if the father embarked on intensive psychotherapy.
Buddy was sent home to be supervised unofficially by a probation
officer. During the next four years Buddy was referred to court re-
peatedly, usually for stealing. At eleven, he was sent to a state training
school; at twelve, he was sent there again; and at thirteen, he went to
live with relatives at the suggestion of his father. They returned him
after he became involved in stealing after a vacation with his parents.
Throughout these four years, periodic efforts were made by probation
officers and aftercare workers to interest the parents in therapy, though
they said that the father didn't want Buddy at home. At one point the
father tried therapy briefly, but stopped because it was too expensive.
However, he refused referrals to clinics which would have been less
costly. Efforts were also made to place Buddy in public mental hospitals,
which were unsuccessful because he was not psychotic.
Finally, after probation, reformatories, aftercare, etc., Buddy was
sent to the diagnostic center again at age fourteen. It repeated its recom-
mendation that he be removed from his home, saying: "There has been
little change in the home situation since 1964 and there probably won't
be any in the future." The center's report also said that Buddy was
more disturbed than he was during his first stay there, although he was
functioning closer to his superior intellectual ability. Several months
later, after two more court referrals, the court arranged for his admis-
sion to a residential school where, according to the probation officer,
"it [was] felt he [would] receive the best of care and understanding."
Buddy's father was ordered to contribute seventy dollars a month for
his support.
A follow-up check eighteen months after placement indicated that
Buddy was still at the school and was doing well there.
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IV. CONCLUSION: A NEW ROLE FOR COUNSEL
Only the relatively happy ending to Buddy's story makes his ex-
perience unusual among the three-or-more time recidivist group. The
fault lies not in society's assumption that most parents are interested in
and capable of helping their delinquent children, but in its refusal to
recognize and take action in those situations where the parents are in-
competent or unconcerned.
This myopia exists not only in delinquency cases but in other legal
actions concerning children as well. Society finds it difficult to believe
that parents will light matches and stick them in their children's body
openings. Nor does it believe that parents will leave young children un-
attended for days. Equally unacceptable is the view that custody battles
frequently reflect parental hatred for each other, rather than their con-
cern for the child's well being. The actions of attorneys and judges
frequently reflect this disbelief that parents can be indifferent or hostile
to their children. Thus custody decisions continue to leave small children
with uncaring, alcoholic, or mentally ill mothers; children continue to be
uncared for and unfed; and battered children become psychotic, phys-
ically maimed, and frequently die from their injuries.
Counsel, of course, cannot alone change society's perceptions of chil-
dren's needs, but he is uniquely qualified to play a major role in this
battle by ensuring that court orders made for a child's benefit are carried
out. An attorney can and should inform the court that his client is not
receiving the psychotherapy the court ordered, or that the parents have
failed to apply for a recommended vocational training program, or that
the child is not being brought to his probation appointments and cannot
get there by himself.
This type of activity does not force the attorney into the role of either
a social worker or a psychiatrist. Attorneys frequently file actions for
adult clients who are not receiving the benefits awarded them by the
court. Actions to enforce alimony awards or to restrain violations of an
injunction are only two of many reasons an attorney may return to court
on his client's behalf.
Extending his activities to include enforcement of his client's rights
at and after disposition, instead of limiting his activities solely to de-
fending the charges against him, requires counsel to look at the juvenile
court process more broadly than he has in the past.
The court decision that the child has committed an act prohibited by
law is the prerequisite to any court action affecting him. If it is deter-
mined that he did not commit the act, the attorney's job is over-as
it would be if there were a similar finding in a civil or criminal case in-
volving an adult.
The attorney, however, cannot limit his interest solely to guilt or in-
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nocence in those cases where the court finds that the child did commit
the act. In such cases, the court is supposed to protect the child from
conditions in his life which lead to crime, and to provide him with what-
ever he needs in the way of care and treatment. Unless the goal of a
nonpunitive system of justice has been abandoned for a juvenile criminal
court, the adjudicated delinquent is entitled to protection and care.
If the attorney limits his activities at disposition solely to securing
what he considers the least serious disposition, he is denying that help
is needed. This is a proper position for counsel to take in those cases
where the act was clearly an isolated one in the child's life. In such cases,
the attorney can and should argue that the child will reimburse the in-
jured party for the damage he has caused, or that he has learned his
lesson and does not require court services.
For a large number of children, this is not the situation. They may
have had several contacts with the police or with the intake division of
the court. Frequently, as has been pointed out before, they have been
adjudicated delinquent in the past. An attorney's contention that a child
does not need services should be based on his knowledge of the facts,
not merely on the family's or child's wish to be left alone.
Where the delinquent's acts are repeated or stem from school, home, or
emotional problems, it is counsel's duty to assist him in getting the
services he needs. The existence of a right to such services is the only
justification for their existence. If children do not have this right, they
may as well be returned to criminal courts-with perhaps less severe
penalties for youthful law breakers.
Counsel's duty to assist a child in receiving needed protection and
care does not end with the court's disposition of the case. Most adults
will notify their attorney if they do not receive the benefits awarded them
by a court. This probably is not true in the case of children. Therefore,
counsel's role in the juvenile court will be new in the sense that he will
have the affirmative responsibility of seeing that the court order has
been carried out. It will not, however, be a burdensome task. Usually,
only a phone call to the probation officer every few months will be neces-
sary to determine that the requirements established by the court are
being fulfilled. If it is the state rather than the family which is making
it impossible to carry out the court's order, counsel must still assert that
the child is being deprived of its services. If the decision of society is
that children should be punished rather than helped, conscientious coun-
sel can at least make it clear that it is society, and not the child, who
has failed. Attorneys should not passively participate in the game of
allowing countless Buddys to be deprived of protection and services
until they "graduate" to adult criminal status by virtue of age, or by
virtue of their alleged failure to benefit from a juvenile system of justice.
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The extent and means by which the court can require parents to carry
out its orders pertaining to delinquent children will not be explored here.
New legislation may be required in some states, but at least one-third
of the states have statutes which allow orders to be issued against
parents or other adults, requiring them to provide services, to cooperate
with the court, or to refrain from certain behavior damaging to the
child.178 Such laws often decree that the court may provide necessary
treatment when the parents refuse to do so. Such an order was used in
a case where a judge believed that a juvenile on probation needed peri-
odic counseling by a social work agency. The child's mother, a Jehovah's
Witness, felt that the Bible was the only assistance her child needed.
The judge issued a protective order,' 7 "and the mother complied with-
out contention.' °80
The Gault decision established that children are entitled to the es-
sentials of due process in juvenile court adjudications of delinquency.
Although statutory and case law established the same rights for persons
accused of being mentally ill in the late 1860's, it took another one
hundred years before the law began even to talk in terms of a "right to
treatment."'18 It should be obvious by now that neither children nor
society can wait another one hundred years for the establishment of a
right to treatment 82 for juvenile delinquents.
178. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-10 (Supp. 1967); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-2421(d) (1959);
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 571-48(7) (1968); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1814(5) (Supp. 1969); Iowa
Code Ann. § 232.34.6 (1969); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(598.18)(i) (1962); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 260.185(f) (1959); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62.200(d) (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 169:17-a (1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.359 (Page 1968); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10,
§ 1116(a)(1) (Supp. 1970); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.507(1) (1969); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-
1095.20(d) (Supp. 1968); S.D. Code § 43.0328 (Supp. 1960); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-
100(13) (Supp. 1967); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.34 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1970); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 14-109 (1965).
179. A protective order may set forth "reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed
for a specified time by a person who is before the court and is a parent or other person
legally responsible for the child's care . . . or respondent or both." N.Y. Family Ct. Act
§ 759 (McKinney 1963).
180. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 43, at 81.
181. The first legislation mentioning a "right to treatment" for the mentally Ill was the
Ervin Act in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code §§ 21-501 to 509 (Supp. III 1970). Sec-
tion 9(b) provides that "any person hospitalized in a public hospital for mental illness
shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment."
182. For articles discussing a right to treatment for juvenile delinquents, see Dorsen &
Rezneck, supra note 94; Irving, Juvenile Justice-One Year Later, 8 J. Family Law 1
(1968); Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57
Geo. L.J. 848 (1969).
